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Abstract
This work proposes a Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Communication Actions that can be performed con-
currently. Unlike Concurrent Epistemic Action Logic introduced by Ditmarsch, Hoek and Kooi [14], where
the concurrency mechanism is the so called true concurrency, here we use an approach based on process
calculus, like CCS and CSP, and Action Models Logic. Our approach makes possible the proof of sound-
ness, completeness and decidability, different from the others approaches. We present an axiomatization
and show that the proof of soundness, completeness and decidability can be done using a reduction method.
Keywords: Epistemic Logic, Dynamic Logic, Action Models, Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Concurrent
Actions, Communication Action.
1 Introduction
Multi-Agent Epistemic Logic has been investigated in Computer Science [5] to repre-
sent and reason about agents (or groups of agents’) knowledge and beliefs. Dynamic
Logic aims to reason about actions (programs) and their effects [7]. Dynamic Epis-
temic Logic [15] is conceived to reason about actions that change agents (or groups
of agents’) epistemic state, i.e., actions which change agent’s knowledge and beliefs.
The first Dynamic Epistemic Logic was proposed independently by [10] and [6]
it is called Public Announcement Logic(PAL) . There are many other approaches
but the one that is used in this work is the Action Model Logic proposed by [1, 2].
1 Email:mario@cos.ufrj.br
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ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
01
16
4v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  4
 Fe
b 2
01
9
Benevides & Lima
Concurrent Dynamic Epistemic Logic was introduced in [14] and it was intended
to extend Epistemic Action Logic proposed by Van Ditmarsch in [13] with con-
current epistemic actions. In this extension they use a mechanism to deal with
concurrency called ”true concurrency” which is inspired on the Concurrent Propo-
sitional Dynamic Logic proposed by Peleg in [9]. An interesting work, entitled
Logics of Communication and Knowledge, presented in [11], proposes a framework
for modeling message passing situations that combines properties of dynamic epis-
temic semantics and history-based approaches, which consists of Kripke models
with records of sent messages in their valuations. Another work that inspired us to
represent communication actions as private epistemic action is [6].
Example: Consider that there are two students waiting for a message from a
teacher to send back the homework and that one student does not know if the other
received or responded the message. To represent this we need to model the following
actions: teacher sending the message (send action), each student receiving (receive
action) and responding (response action) the message independently. We also need
to guarantee that: the receive action can not be performed before the send action,
the response action can not be performed before the receive action and the students
actions can be performed concurrently. Can we model this using Action Models
Logic? Since this is a very small example one can argue that this can done by using
pre conditions and non deterministic choice to model all the possible paths. Now
imagine the same situation with 100 students. It would be not so easy to model.
This work proposes a way to deal with concurrency and communication with
Dynamic Epistemic Logic. We use an approach based on action models and process
calculus, like CCS and CSP, which allow us to prove soundness, completeness and
decidability. Different from [14], that implements concurrency on top of Epistemic
Action Logic, we extends Action Models to deal with concurrency and communica-
tion. The proofs of soundness, completeness and decidability can be done using a
reduction method.
In order to facilitate the proof of soundness, completeness, and decidability we
restricted our concurrency approach. We do not deal with ”true concurrency” like
in [14]. Instead, we adopt the interleaving (non-deterministic choices of all possible
paths) approach used in process algebras like CCS and CSP. Since we are based
on Action Models we can use the pre-conditions to restrict actions that must be
executed after another action. We do not deal with Common Knowledge, because
this would make the proofs a little more tricky.
In sections 2, 3 and 4 we give a brief introduction to Multi-agent Epistemic Logic,
Action Model Logic and Concurrent Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Next we present
the Dynamic Epistemic Logic that we propose in this paper. The last section is the
conclusion.
2 Multi-Agent Epistemic Logic
This section presents the Multi-Agent Epistemic Logic S5a. All the definitions and
theorems of this section are based on [15].
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2.1 Language and Semantics
Definition 2.1 The Epistemic language consists of a countable set Φ of proposition
symbols, a finite set A of agents, a modality Ka for each agent a and the boolean
connectives ¬ and ∧. The formulas are defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | > | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | Kaϕ
where p ∈ Φ, a ∈ A.
Definition 2.2 A multi-agent epistemic frame is a tuple F = (S,Ra) where:
• S is a non-empty set of states;
• Ra is a binary relation over S, for each agent a ∈ A;
Definition 2.3 A multi-agent epistemic model is a pair M = (F ,V), where F is
a frame and V is a valuation function V : Φ → 2S . We call a rooted multi-agent
epistemic model (M, s) an epistemic state.
Definition 2.4 Given a multi-agent epistemic model M = 〈(S,Ra),V〉. The no-
tion of satisfaction M, s |= ϕ is defined as follows:
1. M, s |= p iff s ∈ V(p)
2. M, s |= ¬φ iff M, s 6|= φ
3. M, s |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, s |= φ and M, s |= ψ
4. M, s |= Kaφ iff for all s′ ∈ S : sRas′ ⇒M, s′ |= φ
2.2 Axiomatization
(i) All instantiations of propositional tautologies,
(ii) Ka(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kaϕ→ Kaψ),
(iii) Kaϕ→ ϕ,
(iv) Kaϕ→ KaKaϕ (+ introspection),
(v) ¬Kaϕ→ Ka¬Kaϕ (− introspection),
Inference Rules
M.P. ϕ,ϕ→ ψ/ψ U.G. ϕ/Kaϕ
Theorem 2.5 S5a is sound and complete w.r.t its semantics.
Example 2.6 This example is from [15].
Suppose we have a card game with three cards: 0, 1 and 2, and three players a,
b and c. Each player receives a card and do not know the other players cards.
We use proposition symbols 0x, 1x, 2x for x ∈ {a,b, c} meaning “player x has
card 0, 1 or 2”. We name each state by the cards that each player has in that state,
for instance 012 is the state where player a has card 0, player b has card 1 and
player c has card 2 3 . The folowing epsitemic model repesents the epistemic state
of each agent 4 .
3 A state name underlined means current state
4 We omitt the reflexive loops in the picture.
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Hexa1 = 〈(S,R),V〉:
• S = {012, 021, 102, 120, 201, 210}
• R = {(012, 012), (012, 021), (021, 021), . . . }
• V(0a) = {012, 021}, V(1a) = {102, 120}, ...
Fig. 1. Epistemic Model Hexa1
3 Action Models
All the definitions and theorems of this section are based on [15].
3.1 Language and Semantics
Definition 3.1 An action model M is a structure 〈S,∼a, pre〉, where:
• S is a finite domain of action points or events;
• ∼a is an equivalence relation on S, for each agent a ∈ A;
• pre : S 7→ L is a precondition function that assigns a precondition to each s ∈ S.
Rooted action models is an action model with a distinguished state (M, s).
Note that S is different from S, M is different from M and s is different from s.
Definition 3.2 The Action Model language consists of a countable set Φ of propo-
sition symbols, a finite set A of agents, the boolean connectives ¬ and ∧, a modality
Ka for each agent a ∈ A and a modality [α] . The formulas are defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | > | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | Kaϕ | [α]ϕ,
α ::= (M, s) | α1;α2 | α1 ∪ α2
where p ∈ Φ, a ∈ A, (M, s) a rooted action model and 〈α〉 ↔ ¬[¬α]
Definition 3.3 Given an epistemic state (M, s) with M = 〈(S,Ra),V〉 and a
rooted action model (M, s) with M = 〈S,∼a, pre〉. The result of executing (M, s) in
(M, s) is (M⊗M, (s, s)) where M⊗M = 〈(S′, R′a),V′〉 such that:
(i) S′ = {(s, s) such that s ∈ S, s ∈ S, and M, s |= pre(s)}
(ii) (s, s)R′a(t, t) iff (s Ra t and s ∼a t)
(iii) (s, s) ∈ V′(p) iff s ∈ V(p)
Definition 3.4 Composition of rooted action models
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Given rooted action models (M, s) with M = 〈S,∼, pre〉 and (M′, s′) with M′ =
〈S′,∼′, pre′〉, their composition is the action model (M;M′, (s, s′)) with M;M′ =
〈S′′,∼′′, pre′′〉:
• S′′ = {(s, s′) such that s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S′ }
• (s, s′) ∼′′a (t, t′) iff (s ∼a t and s′ ∼′a t′)
• pre′′(s, s′) = 〈(M, s)〉pre′(s′)
Definition 3.5 Given a rooted epistemic state (M, s) withM = 〈(S,Ra),V〉 and a
rooted action model (M, s) with M = 〈S,∼, pre〉. The notion of satisfactionM, s |= ϕ
extends from 2.4 and is defined as follows
1,2,3, 4 as in definition 2.4
5. M, s |= [(M, s)]φ iff M, s |= pre(s)⇒M⊗M, (s, s) |= φ
6. Jα ∪ βK iff JαK ∪ JβK
7. J(M, s); (M′, s′)K iff (M;M′, (s, s′)) Composition of action models
Where J.K is the interpretation on a action model.
3.2 Axiomatization
Epistemic Logic Axioms
Axioms (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) of section 2.2,
Action Model Logic Axioms
(vi) [(M, s)]p↔ (pre(s)→ p),
(vii) [(M, s)]¬φ↔ (pre(s)→ ¬[(M, s)]φ)
(viii) [(M, s)](φ ∧ ψ)↔ ([(M, s)]φ ∧ [(M, s)]ψ)
(ix) [(M, s)]Kaφ↔ (pre(s)→
∧
s∼atKa[(M, t)]φ)
(x) [(M, s)][(M′, s′)]φ↔ [(M, s); (M′, s′)]φ
(xi) [(M, s) ∪ (M′, s′)]φ↔ [(M, s)]φ ∧ [(M′, s′)]φ
Inference Rules
M.P. ϕ,ϕ→ ψ/ψ U.G. ϕ/Kaϕ ϕ/[α]ϕ
Every formula in the language of action model logic without common knowledge
is equivalent to a formula in the language of epistemic logic [15].
Example 3.6 Continuation of example 2.6
Suppose now agent a wants to perform the action of showing her card to agent
b. In fact, we have three actions, agent a showing either card 0, 1 or 2 to agent
b. Agents a and b can distinguish between these three action but agent c cannot.
This situation can be represented by the action model below.
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Fig. 2. Action Model for show
• S = {sh0, sh1, sh2}
• ∼a = {(s, s) | s ∈ S}
• ∼b = {(s, s) | s ∈ S}
• ∼c = S× S
• pre(sh0) = 0a
• pre(sh1) = 1a
• pre(sh2) = 2a
If agent a performs the action of showing her card to agent b on the epistemic
model of example 2.6, we obtain:
Fig. 3. Hexa1 After the Execution of show
This new epistemic model, shown in figure 3, is obtained by the product of
epistemic model of figure 1 with the action model of figure 2. It is important to
notice that the number of states after the product is 18 (6 × 3), but most of them
are thrown out because they do not satisfy the precondition.
4 Epistemic Actions and Concurrent Dynamic Epis-
temic Logic
This section provides a brief introduction to the works presented in [14] and [15].
Epistemic Actions is an extension of Multi-Agent Epismtemic Logic to deal with
new information (updates), like Action Models, but it uses a different approach to
deal with new information. Concurrent Dynamic Epistemic Logic proposes a way
to deal with concurrency in Epistemic Actions.
4.1 Language and Semantics
Definition 4.1 The Epistemic Actions language consists of a countable set Φ of
proposition symbols, a finite set A of agents, the boolean connectives ¬ and ∧, a
modality Ka for each agent a ∈ A and a modality [α] . The formulas and the actions
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are defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | > | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | Kaϕ | [α]ϕ,
α ::=?α | LBβ | (α!α) | (α¡α) | (α;β) | (α1 ∪ α2)
where p ∈ Φ, a ∈ A, B ⊆ A, L stands for learning and LBβ means ’group B learn
that β, ?α is a test, (α!α) is called left local choice, (α¡α) is called right local choice,
(α;β) is sequential composition (first α then β), (α1 ∪ α2) is non-deterministic
choice.
Definition 4.2 Given the epistemic model M = 〈S,∼a, V 〉 and the state s ∈ S.
The notion of satisfaction M, s |= ϕ extends from 2.4 and is defined as follows
1,2,3, 4 as in definition 2.4
5. M, s |= [α]φ iff for all (M′, s′) : (M, s)[α](M′, s′) implies (M′, s′) |= φ
6. (M, s)[?φ](M′, s′) iff M′ = 〈[φ]M , ∅, V ∩ [φ]M 〉 and s′ = s
7. (M, s)[LGφ](M′, s′) iff M′ = 〈S′,∼′, V ′〉 and (M, s)[φ]s′
8. Jα;α′K = JαK ◦ Jα′K
9. Jα ∪ α′K = JαK ∪ Jα′K
10. Jα!α′K = JαK
The Concurrent Dynamic Epistemic Logic language adds the concurrent execu-
tion operator to the actions of Epistemic Actions language. The actions are defined
as follows:
α ::=?α | LBβ | (α!α) | (α¡α) | (α;β) | (α1 ∪ α2) | (α1 ∩ α2)
where (α1 ∩ α2) represents a concurrent execution.
Example 4.3 In order to illustrate the use of the language of Epistemic Actions,
we consider the card game presented in section 3.
The Epistemic Model is the same shown in figure 1.
The action of “agent a showing her card to agent b” can be model as:
(L(b)?0a ∪ L(b)?1a ∪ L(b)?2a); (L(a,b,c)?(Kb0a ∨Kb1a ∨Kb2a))
This means that agent a tells agent b her card and after that all agents know
that agent b knows the card that agent a holds. After performing this action, the
resulting epistemic model is the same as in figure 3.
5 Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Communication Ac-
tions
5.1 Process Calculus
In this section, we propose a very small process (program) calculus for the programs
of Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Communication Actions (DELWCA). It is inspired
by [16].
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Let A = {1, ..., n}, denoted by i, j..., be a finite set of agents,
AMS={a1, a2, a3 . . .} be a finite set of action models and N =
{c1, c2, c3, . . . , c1, c2, c3, . . .} be a finite set of communication actions. As a
convention, communication actions with one overline represent output and with
no overlines represent an input. Communication actions can be combined to
form a private action model, by joining an output communication action with its
respective input ( [c1, c1] = a1 ). The action model resultant of the join of two
communication actions is known as silent action, denoted by τ si,j(.), that can be
interpreted as the result of a communication between agents i and j 5 .
Definition 5.1 The language can be defined as follows.
η ::= α | α.η | η1; η2 | η1 + η2, where α ∈ AMS ∪N
pi ::= η | β.pi | pi1;pi2 | pi1 + pi2 | η1 ‖ η2 · · · ‖ ηn
where n = |A| and ηi denotes the program performed by agent i.
We use pi and η to denote processes (programs) and α and β to denote action
models and communication actions.
The prefix operator . denotes that the process will first perform the action α
and then behave as pi. The summation (or nondeterministic choice) operator +
denotes that the process will make a nondeterministic choice to behave as either
pi1 or pi2. The parallel composition operator ‖ denotes that the processes η1, ..., ηn,
performed by agents 1, ..., n respectively, may proceed independently or may commu-
nicate through a common channel.
We write pi
α→ pi′ to express that the process pi can perform the action α and
after that behave as pi′. We write pi α→ √ to express that the process pi successfully
finishes after performing the action α. A process finishes when there is no possible
action left for it to perform. For example, β
β→ √. When a process finishes inside
a parallel composition, sequential composition or non-deterministic choice we write
pi instead of pi|√, pi;√ and pi +√. We also write √ instead of √|√.
Like [8] we need to restrict the agents to perform some actions. In our case we
don’t want to perform communication actions, but we can perform τ action which
results from the combination of communication actions (a, a).
The semantics of our process calculus can be given by the transition rules pre-
sented in table 1, where pi and η are process specifications, while pi′ and η′ are
process specifications or
√
. The τ si,j(.) action represents an internal communication
action from agent i to agent j.
5 As silent actions τsi,j(.) are interpreted as private action models, the index s denotes the root of the action
model τsi,j(.).
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α
α→ √
α.pi
α→ pi
pi1
α→ pi′1
pi1;pi2
α→ pi′1;pi2
pi1
α→ pi′1
pi1 + pi2
α→ pi′1
pi2
β→ pi′2
pi1 + pi2
β→ pi′2
ηi
α→ η′i
(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηi ‖ ... ‖ ηn) α→ (η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ ηn)
, for all i, j ∈ A
ηi
c→ η′i, ηj c→ η′j
(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηi ‖ ... ‖ ηj ‖ ... ‖ ηn) τi,j(.)→ (η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn)
, for all i, j ∈ A
Table 1
Transition Relation
Example 5.2 Continuation of the card game example.
Now suppose that the game is online and player a sends a message p to players
b and c. So after the message p players b and c know all the cards. This problem
can be modeled as follows:
• pi1 = cab(p); cac(p) + cac(p); cab(p)
• pi2 = cab(.).β
• pi3 = cac(.).γ
• pi1‖2‖3 = (pi1 ‖ pi2 ‖ pi3)
Given the programs pi1, pi2 and pi3, initially we have two possible actions: com-
munication between a and b or communication between a and c. Suppose that the
communication between a and b occurs first, then we will have two possible actions:
communication between a and c or action β and so on ...
We can represent this using parallel composition:
pi1 ‖ pi2 ‖ pi3
τab
tt
τac
**◦
β

τac

◦
τab

γ
◦
τac

◦
β

γ

◦
γ

β

◦
τab
◦
γ

◦
γ

◦
β

◦
β

◦
γ

◦
β
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fig. 4. Possible Runs of Process pi1 ‖ pi2 ‖ pi3
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So :
• 〈pi1‖2‖3〉.(K2p ∧K3p) is true
• 〈pi1‖2‖3〉.(K2p ∨K3p) is true
• 〈pi1‖2‖3〉.¬(K2p ∨K3p) is false
5.2 Bisimulation
The concept of bisimulation is a key notion in any process algebra. It is an equiv-
alence relation between processes which have mutually similar behavior. The intu-
ition is that two bisimilar processes cannot be distinguished by an external observer.
Using the notion of bisimulation allows us to transform any process in an equivalent
one that is a summation of all their possible actions, that is what the Expansion
Law (theorem 5.5) states.
There are two possible semantics for the τ action in CCS: it can be regarded
as being observable, in the same way as the communication actions, or it can be
regarded as being invisible. We adopt the first one, since it is more generic and
fits better in our formalism. Whenever the τ action is observable the bisimulation
relation is called strong.
Definition 5.3 ( [8]) Let Π be the set of all processes. A set Z ⊆ Π × Π is a
strong bisimulation if (pi1, pi2) ∈ Z implies the following for all α ∈ AMS :
• If pi1
α→ pi′1, then there is pi′2 ∈ Π such that pi2 α→ pi′2 and (pi′1, pi′2) ∈ Z;
• If pi2
α→ pi′2, then there is pi′1 ∈ Π such that pi1 α→ pi′1 and (pi′1, pi′2) ∈ Z;
• pi1
α→ √ if and only if pi2 α→ √.
Definition 5.4 ( [8]) Two process pi and pi′ are strongly bisimilar (or simply
bisimilar), denoted by pi ' pi′, if there is a strong bisimulation Z such that
(pi, pi′) ∈ Z.
Now, we introduce the Expansion Law, which is very important in the definition
of the semantic and in the axiomatization of our logic. We present a particular case
of the Expansion Law, which is suited to our needs. The most general case of the
Expansion Law is presented in [8].
Theorem 5.5 ( [8]) [Expansion Law (EL)] Let pi = (η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn). Then
pi ∼
∑
ηi
α→η′i
α.(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ ηn)+
∑
(ηi
c→η′i)&(ηj
c→η′j)
τi,j(.).(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn)
were α is a action model and τi,j is a private action model resulted by the com-
bination of two communication actions.
We denote the right side of this bisimilarity by Exp(pi). We also denote by 0
the processes whose expansion is empty, i.e., there is no (ηi
c→ η′i) , (ηj c→ η′j) and
(ηk
α→ η′k) for any i, j, k ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Proof. This follows from table 1 and definitions 5.3 and 5.4. A detailed proof for
the most general case of this theorem can be found in [8]. 2
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The Expansion Law is a very useful property of CCS processes. Its intuition
is that processes can be rewritten as a summation of all their possible actions.
Suppose we have a processes A
def
= c.A′ + α.A′′ and B def= c.B′ + β.B′′, then the
process (A ‖ B) is equivalent, using the Expansion Law, to
(A ‖ B) ' α.(A′′ ‖ B) + β.(A ‖ B′′) + τAB.(A′ ‖ B′)
5.3 Language
In this section we present the DELWCA language.
Definition 5.6 The DELWCA language consists of a set Φ of countably many
proposition symbols, a set Π of programs as defined in 5.1, a finite set A of agents,
the boolean connectives ¬ and ∧, a modality 〈pi〉 for every program pi ∈ Π (as defined
in section 5.1) and a modality Ka for each agent a. The formulas are defined as
follows:
ϕ ::= p | > | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | 〈pi〉ϕ | Kiϕ
where p ∈ Φ, pi ∈ Π, i ∈ A and 〈pi〉ϕ means that exists a execution of pi that leads
to a state where ϕ is true.
5.4 Semantics
For communication actions (actions in N ) we need to relax the fact that relations in
action models are equivalence relations, we just need them to be relations. For this
case all the definitions of action models (def. 3.1), execution (product) of action
models (def. 3.3), composition of action models (def. 3.4) can be easily adapted.
Definition 5.7 Let A be the set of all agents and i, j ∈ A. The action model
τ si,j(ϕ) = (M, s), with M = 〈S,∼, pre〉, is defined as follows:
• S = {s, t}
• ∼i = {(s, s), (t, t)}
• ∼j = {(s, s), (t, t)}
• ∼k = {(s, t), (t, t)}, for all k ∈ A\{i, j}
• pre(s) = ϕ
• pre(t) = >
Fig. 5. Action Model for τsi,j
In order to obtain the definition of satisfaction for DELWCA we must add the
following condition to definition 3.5:
J(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K = { Jτi,j(.)K; J(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K, for all (ηi c1→ η′i) &
(ηj
c1→ η′j) }
⋃ { JαK; J(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K, for all (ηi α→ η′i) }
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Benevides & Lima
5.4.1 Axiomatization
(i) All instantiations of propositional tautologies,
Epistemic Logic Axioms
Axioms (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) of section 2.2,
Action Model Axioms
Axioms (vi), (vii), (viii) and (ix) of section 3.2,
PDL Axioms
(x) [pi](φ→ ψ)→ ([pi]φ→ [pi]ψ) (K axiom)
(xi) [pi1][pi2]φ↔ [pi1;pi2]φ (Composition)
(xii) [pi1 + pi2]φ↔ [pi1]φ ∧ [pi2]φ (Non-deterministic Choice)
(xiii) [α.pi]φ↔ [α][pi]φ (Prefix) 6
(xiv) [α.pi]φ↔ pre(α)→ [pi]φ
Concurrent Action Axiom
(xv) [η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]φ↔ [Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]φ
Inference Rules
M.P. ϕ,ϕ→ ψ/ψ U.G. ϕ/[pi]ϕ ϕ/Kaϕ
Proposition 5.8 ` [α;pi2]φ↔ [α][pi2]φ↔ [α.pi2]φ↔ pre(α)→ [pi2]φ
Example 5.9 A supervisor Ane (1) and her two students Bob(2) and Cathy(3)
are working in their computer located at their own house. The supervisor wants
to book a meeting ”tomorrow at 16:00”. She sends a message asynchronously to
Bob and Cathy. We are supposing that the supervisor uses channels c12 and c13 to
communicate with Bob and Cathy respectively. We represent Anne, Bob and Cathy
by processes pi1, pi2 and pi3 respectively, and their parallel composition by pi1‖2‖3.
• pi1 = c12(p); c13(p) + c13(p); c12(p)
• pi2 = c12(.)
• pi3 = c13(.)
• pi1‖2‖3 = (pi1 ‖ pi2 ‖ pi3)
6 It is important to notice that Prefix is a special case of Composition
12
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We have two possible runs process pi1‖2‖3 as shown in the tree in figure 6.
pi1 ‖ pi2 ‖ pi3
τ12
yy
τ13
%%◦
τ13

◦
τ12
◦ ◦
Fig. 6. Possible Runs of Process pi1 ‖ pi2 ‖ pi3
Let propositional symbol p represent ”tomorrow at 16:00”. The epistemic model
M′ at the begging is as shown in figure 7.
u ◦ 2, 3 ◦ v
p ¬p
Fig. 7. Initial Epistemic Model M0
The action models for τ12 and τ13 are presented in figures 8 and 9.
Fig. 8. Action Model for τ12
Fig. 9. Action Model for τ13
Suppose τ12 is performed before τ13. After the execution of τ12 we obtain the
epistemic model picture in figure 10.
Fig. 10. Epistemic Model M1 =M0 ⊗ τ12
It is important to notice that at state us1 Ane and Bob knows p M1, us1 `
K1p∧K2p but Cath doesn’tM1, us1 ` ¬K3p. After the second communication τ13
we have the epistemic model of figure 11.
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Fig. 11. Epistemic Model M2 =M1 ⊗ τ13 =M0 ⊗ τ12 ⊗ τ13
We can notice, from figure 11 that at state us1s2 Ane, Bob and Cath knows p
M2, us1s2 ` K1p∧K2p∧K3p as expected. If we execute run τ13; τ12 we obtain the
model M3 as shown in figure 12.
Fig. 12. Epistemic Model M3 =M0 ⊗ τ13 ⊗ τ12
We can show, from figure 12, that Ane, Bob and Cath know p M3, us1s2 `
K1p ∧K2p ∧K3p as expected.
5.5 Soundness, Completeness and Decidability
5.5.1 Soundness
We need to prove that all axioms are valid. Axioms i to xiii are standard from
Dynamic Epistemic Logic literature and can be found in [15]. We prove validity
only for axiom 6.
Lemma 5.10 [η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]φ↔ [Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]φ is valid.
5.5.2 Completeness
The proof of completeness is similar to the proof for Public Announcement and
Action Models Logics introduced in [12] Dynamic Epistemic Logic. We prove com-
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pleteness showing that every formula in DELWCA is equivalent to formula in Epis-
temic Logic. In order to achieve that we only have to provide a translation function
that translate every DELWCA formula to a formula without communication actions
and concurrency.
5.5.3 Decidability
Decidability follows directly from the decidability of S5a.
6 Conclusions
In this work we present a Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Communication Actions
that can be performed concurrently. In order to achieve that we propose a PDL like
language for actions and develop a small process calculus. We show that it’s easy
to model problems of communication and concurrency with the proposed dynamic
epistemic logic. The main feature of it is the Expansion rule which allows for
representing the parallel composition operator. This approach is similar to the one
introduced in [3, 4].
We represent communication actions as private Action Models where the rela-
tions are not equivalence relations. We present an axiomatization and prove com-
pleteness using reduction technique.
As future work we would like to investigate the extension with common knowl-
edge and/or iteration operators, study other types of communications where agents
are not reliable or not trustful, extend this to Dynamic Epistemic Logic With Post-
Conditions and change DEMO, or create a new Model Checker, to deal with con-
currency and communication.
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Appendix A Soundness Proof
We need to prove Lemma 5.10.
Proof. We have to show that (1) ↔ (2), where (1) is [η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]φ and (2) is
[Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]φ.
We can represent (1) and (2) like this:
(1) = (s|∀y(s, s′) ∈ Jη1 ‖ ... ‖ ηnK→ s′ ∈ JφK)
(2) = (s|∀y(s, s′) ∈ JExp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K→ s′ ∈ JφK)
So we need to show thatJη1 ‖ ... ‖ ηnK↔ JExp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K . (3)↔ (4).
Using the definition 3.5 we have that
(3) = JτK; Jη1 ‖ ...η′i...η′j ... ‖ ηnK⋃JαK; Jη1 ‖ ...η′i... ‖ ηnK⋃JβK; Jη1 ‖ ...η′j ... ‖ ηnK
Using the expansion law we have that
(4) = J∑
(ηi
c→η′i)&(ηj
c→η′j)
τi,j(.).(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn)
+
∑
(ηk
α→η′k)
αk.(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′k ‖ ... ‖ ηn) +
∑
(ηk
β→η′k)
βk.(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′k ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K
(4) = J∑
(ηi
c→η′i)&(ηj
c→η′j)
τi,j(.).(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K⋃J∑
(ηk
α→η′k)
αk.(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′k ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K⋃J∑(ηk β→η′k) βk.(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′k ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K
Since in (2) we are using (s, s′) we can omite the
∑
(4) = Jτi,j(.).(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K⋃Jαk.(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′k ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K⋃Jβk.(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′k ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K
Using definition 9 we have
(4) = Jτi,j(.)K; J(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K⋃JαkK; J(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′k ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K⋃JβkK; J(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′k ‖ ... ‖ ηn)K
So (1)↔ (2)
2
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Appendix B Completeness Proof
We need to provide a translation function that translate every DELWCA formula
to a formula without communication actions.
Definition B.1 The translation function t: LDELWCA → LK is defined as follows:
t(p) = p
t(¬ϕ) = ¬t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t(ϕ) ∧ t(ψ)
t(Kaϕ) = Kat(ϕ)
t([M, s]p) = t(pre(s)→ p))
t([M, s]¬ϕ) = t(pre(s)→ ¬[M, s]ϕ)
t([M, s](ϕ ∧ ψ)) = t([M, s]ϕ ∧ [M, s]ψ)
t([M, s]Kaϕ) = t(pre(s)→ Ka[M, s]ϕ)
t([pi1][pi2]ϕ) = t([pi1;pi2]ϕ)
t([pi1 + pi2]ϕ) = t([pi1]ϕ) ∧ t([pi2]ϕ)
t([α][pi]ϕ) = t([α;pi1]ϕ)
t([η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]ϕ) = t([Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]ϕ)
t([0]ϕ) = t(ϕ)
t([M, s][pi]ϕ) = t(pre(s)→ [pi]ϕ)
In order to prove completeness we need to prove that every CDEL formula can
be proved (in the axiomatic system) equivalent to its translation. This proof is by
induction on the complexity of each formula which is defined below.
Let k be the number of all possible communications that can occur in η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn,
i.e. all pairs (ηi
si,j(.)→ η′i) and (ηj
ri,j(.)→ η′j), for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
Definition B.2 The complexity c : LDELWCA → N is defined as follows:
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c(0) = 1
c(α;pi) = 1 + c(pi)
c(pi1 + pi2) = 2 +max{c(pi1), c(pi2)}
c(pi1;pi2) = 1 + c(pi1) + c(pi2)
c(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn) = k + c(η1) + · · ·+ c(ηn)
c(p) = 1
c(¬ϕ) = 1 + c(ϕ)
c(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1 +max(c(ϕ), c(ψ))
c(Kaϕ) = 1 + c(ϕ)
c([pi]ϕ) = (4 + c(pi)) ∗ c(ϕ)
c(M, s) = max{c(pre(t)) | t ∈ M}
c([0])ϕ) = 1 + c(ϕ)
We have to prove that the complexity of a formula is strictly greater than the
complexity of its translation. In order to achieve that we prove the next lemma
that assures that after a communication the complexity always decreases.
Lemma B.3 If pi
α→ pi′, then c(pi) > c(pi′).
Proof. By induction on |pi|. Base: It holds for 0, once 0
α
6→,
Induction Hypothesis: it holds for |pi| < m.
(i) pi = α.pi′: we know that pi α→ pi′ and c(α.pi) = 1 + c(pi′), so c(pi) > c(pi′).
(ii) pi = pi1 + pi2: either pi1
α→ pi′1 or pi2 α→ pi′2. By the semantics rules of table 1
either pi
α→ pi′1 (1) or pi α→ pi′2 (2). By the induction hypothesis c(pi1) > c(pi′1)
and c(pi2) > c(pi
′
2). As
c(pi) = 2 +max{pi1, pi2}
From (1) c(pi) > c(pi1) > c(pi
′
1)
From (2) c(pi) > c(pi2) > c(pi
′
2)
(iii) pi = pi1;pi2: if pi1
α→ pi′1, then, by the semantics rules of table 1, pi α→ pi′1;pi2. By
the induction hypothesis c(pi1) > c(pi
′
1). As
c(pi) = 1 + c(pi1) + c(pi2) > 1 + c(pi
′
1) + c(pi2) = c(pi
′
1;pi2)
(iv) pi = η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn: if pi τi,j(.)→ pi′, then there exists (ηi si,j(.)→ η′i) and (ηj
ri,j(.)→ η′j),
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. And pi′ = η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn. By the induction
hypothesis c(ηi) > c(η
′
i) and c(ηj) > c(η
′
j). So,
c(pi) = k + c(η1) + · · ·+ c(ηi) + · · ·+ c(ηj) + · · ·+ c(ηn) > k + c(η1) + · · ·+
c(η′i) + · · ·+ c(η′j) + · · ·+ c(ηn) = c(pi′).
2
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Corollary B.4 c(pi = η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn) > c(Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)
Proof. By the definition of Exp
c(Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn) =
c(
∑
τi,j .(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn)) =
k − 1 +maxij(c(τi,j .(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn)) =
k +maxij(c((η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn)) = We know that
η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn τi,j(.)→ η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn,
by lemma B.3
c(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn) > c(η1 ‖ ... ‖ η′i ‖ ... ‖ η′j ‖ ... ‖ ηn), Then c(pi = η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn) >
c(Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn). 2
Lemma B.5 For all ϕ and ψ:
(i) c(ψ) ≥ c(ϕ) se ϕ ∈ Sub(ψ)
(ii) c([M, s]p) > c(pre(s)→ p))
(iii) c([M, s]¬ϕ) > c(pre(s)→ ¬[M, s]ϕ)
(iv) c([M, s](ϕ ∧ ψ)) > c([M, s]ϕ ∧ [M, s]ψ)
(v) c([M, s]Kaϕ) > c(pre(s)→ Ka[M, s]ϕ)
(vi) c([pi1][pi2]ϕ) > c([pi1;pi2]ϕ)
(vii) c([pi1 + pi2]ϕ) > c([pi1]ϕ ∧ [pi2]ϕ)
(viii) c([α][pi]ϕ) > c([α;pi1]ϕ)
(ix) c([η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]ϕ) > c([Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]ϕ)
(x) c([0]ϕ) > c(ϕ)
Proof. The proofs of 1, 3, 4 e 5 is straightforward from definition B.2.
2. We know that c(φ→ ψ) = 2 + c(φ) + c(ψ)
· c([M, s]p) = (4 + c(M, s)) ∗ c(p) = 4 +max{c(pre(t) | t ∈ M}
· c(pre(s)→ p) = 2 + c(pre(s)) + 1 = 3 + c(pre(s))
Therefore, c([M, s]p) > c(pre(s)→ p))
6. c([pi1;pi2]ϕ) = (4 + c(pi1;pi2).c(ϕ))
c([pi1;pi2]ϕ) = (5 + c(pi1) + c(pi2)).c(ϕ))
c([pi1][pi2]ϕ) = (4 + c(pi1)).c([pi2]ϕ)
c([pi1][pi2]ϕ) = (4 + c(pi1)).(4 + c(pi2)).c(ϕ))
c([pi1][pi2]ϕ) = (16 + 4(c(pi1) + c(pi2)) + c(pi1)c(pi2))c(ϕ))
c([pi1][pi2]ϕ) > c([pi1;pi2]ϕ)
7. c([pi1 + pi2]ϕ) = (4 + c(pi1 + pi2).c(ϕ))
c([pi1 + pi2]ϕ) = (6 +max{c(pi1), c(pi2)}).c(ϕ))
c([pi1]ϕ ∧ [pi2]ϕ) = (1 +max{c([pi1]ϕ), c([pi2]ϕ)})
c([pi1]ϕ ∧ [pi2]ϕ) = (1 +max{(4 + c(pi1))c(ϕ), (4 + c(pi2))c(ϕ)})
c([pi1]ϕ ∧ [pi2]ϕ) = (5 +max{c(pi1), c(pi2)})c(ϕ)
c([pi1 + pi2]ϕ) > c([pi1]ϕ ∧ [pi2]ϕ)
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8. this case is analogous to 6.
9. · c([η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]ϕ)) = (4 + c(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)) ∗ c(ϕ)
· c([Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]ϕ) = (4 + c(Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn))) ∗ c(ϕ)
The proof of completeness is similar to the proof for Public Announcement
and Action Models Logics introduced in [12] Dynamic Epistemic Logic. We
prove completeness showing that every formula in DELWCA is equivalent to
formula in Epistemic Logic. In order to achieve that we only have to provide a
translation function that translate every DELWCA formula to a formula with-
out communication actions.
By corollary B.4,
c([η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]ϕ) > c([Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]ϕ)
2
The following lemma asserts that every formula is deductively equivalent to its
translation.
Lemma B.6 For all formulas ϕ ∈ LDELWCAholds :
` ϕ↔ t(ϕ)
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ (c(ϕ)).
Induction Hypothesis: Suppose
` ϕ↔ t(ϕ)
holds for formulas ϕ where c(ϕ) < m
(i) Base: ϕ = p follows from the tautology ` p↔ p; item ϕ = ¬ψ, ψ1 ∧ ψ2 Kaψ:
straightforward from the Induction Hypothesis;
(ii) ϕ = [M, s]p:
t([M, s]p) = t(pre(s) → p)), by lemma B.5 and the induction hypothesis we
have
` t(pre(s)→ p))↔ pre(s)→ p), but by axiom 6
` pre(s)→ p)↔ [M, s]p, and thus
` t([M, s]p)↔ [M, s]p
(iii) ϕ = [η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]ψ:
t([η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]ψ) = t([Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]ψ), by lemma B.5 and the induction
hypothesis we have
` t([Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]ψ)↔ [Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]ψ, by axiom 13
` [η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]ψ ↔ [Exp(η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn)]ψ and thus
` t([η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]ψ)↔ ([η1 ‖ ... ‖ ηn]ψ
(iv) ϕ ∈ {[α.pi]ψ, [pi1 + pi2]ψ, [pi1;pi2]ψ, [0]ψ} is analogous to case 4.
2
Completeness follows.
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Theorem B.7 (Complteness) For all ϕ ∈ LDELWCA
|= ϕ implies ` ϕ
Proof. Suppose |= ϕ. By lemma B.6 we know that ` ϕ ↔ t(ϕ). By soundness
we have |= ϕ ↔ t(ϕ) and thus |= t(ϕ). But as t(ϕ) has no action modalities, it
is a formula of Multi-agent Epistemic Logic S5a and as S5a is complete we have
`S5a t(ϕ), but as S5a is contained in DELWCA, we have ` t(ϕ).
2
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